The Impact of Privatisation and Regulatory Reform on Wage Premia in State-Owned Enterprises in South Africa by Hattingh, Damian et al.
The Impact of Privatisation and Regulatory Reform on 
Wage Premia in State-Owned Enterprises in South 
Africa 
Damian Hattingh
James Hodge
1Sandrine Rospabe
Development Policy Research Unit                                                                                 July  2003
Working Paper 03/78                                                                             ISBN 0-7992-2199-6
1
   Postgraduate student, lecturer and visiting scholar respectively at the School of Economics, University of Cape Town. 
  Contact Author: James Hodge - jhodge@commerce.uct.ac.za
Abstract
Whilst much has been said about the employment effects of the privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises in South Africa, the debate has largely overlooked the impact of these events on the 
wage levels of those workers that retain their jobs in the restructuring process. This paper 
estimates earnings functions for workers in the South African economy to determine the impact of 
these changes. The results suggest that those workers that do retain their jobs in the restructuring 
process will be better off initially. This is because the state-owned firm will shift to become a 
partially private firm that operates in a highly regulated industry structure with limited competition. 
This enables the firm to earn abnormal profits and unionised labour is able to share in some of 
these profits. However, uncertainty at the individual level over whether they will be one of the lucky 
workers to retain their post will ensure that most workers will oppose any restructuring. The paper 
also demonstrates that any further liberalisation of the previously state-owned sector to introduce 
greater competition will make those workers worse off as their premium is eroded along with the 
abnormal profits. This applies as much to union members and non-union members. The result is 
that workers can be expected to oppose any further restructuring of these former state-owned 
firms after they have been initially reformed. 
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Introduction
One of the strong thrusts of economic policy in South Africa currently is the restructuring of public 
enterprises and the liberalisation of the sectors in which they operate to allow greater competition 
(Republic of South Africa, 2000). There has been considerable opposition to such a policy on the 
basis that it may have a negative distributional impact. One of the primary concerns of the labour 
2movement is the potential loss of employment from any restructuring exercise.  This has led to a 
framework agreement with the government that aims to limit the extent of employment loss and 
create alternative opportunities for workers that do get retrenched. However, an aspect that has 
received scant attention is the impact of this restructuring and liberalisation process on the wage 
levels of those that remain in employment. While wages for any particular occupation or skill are 
responsive to general supply and demand conditions in the country, some sectors of the economy 
may pay relatively higher or lower wages for the same occupation or skill for various reasons. Two 
important factors are ownership and the degree of competition. 
It is expected that the process of wage determination within the firm will change as the 
government's control over these firms weakens. Managers will become increasingly responsive to 
profit demands and less to social demands. However, not only does ownership matter for wage 
determination, but also the degree of competition that the firm faces once it is restructured. Greater 
levels of competition would put greater cost-reducing pressure on the firm, giving it more incentive 
to resist large wage increases, while an industry structure with highly regulated entry may provide 
greater scope for profits and therefore a more generous wage settlement each year. 
The aim of this paper is to shed some light on how wages in these state-owned enterprises are 
likely to change relative to other sectors of the economy in South Africa during this process. The 
paper firstly outlines the reason why we expect to see wage levels for the same occupation/skill 
differing between public and private sectors of the economy and between industries with high 
levels of entry regulation and those without. This includes a brief review of how the particular wage 
bargaining process in South Africa will also affect wage premia, especially the union premium. We 
then examine the empirical evidence from other countries before embarking on an empirical 
analysis of South Africa. The empirical analysis for South Africa involves estimating earnings 
functions for three components of the economy  the state-owned sector, the highly regulated 
private sector, and the lightly regulated (or strongly competitive) private sector. The lightly 
regulated private sector with no entry restrictions provides the benchmark for wage comparisons. 
This enables an indication of how wages in the state-owned sector can be expected to evolve firstly 
as these firms are privatised into a market where they operate as a regulated monopoly or with only 
limited competition, and then as greater controls on entry are lifted and competition increases. 
1
2
   The labour movement has also taken up more general social concerns such as pricing and access for the poor. 
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Impact of Ownership and Competition on Wage Levels
Public Ownership and Wage Levels
Wages in state owned enterprises (SOEs) are generally different to those in the private sector (see 
for example Gyourko and Tracy 1988). This is largely attributed to the fact that while the owners of 
private firms have as their overriding objective the maximisation of profit, the owners of SOEs have 
to respond to a wide array of different objectives, often assumed to be the maximisation of social 
welfare. This may entail, for example, paying higher wages in an attempt to raise living standards, 
paying lower wages in an attempt to dampen inflationary pressure and exercise fiscal restraint, or 
over-employing in an attempt to reduce unemployment (Viscusi et al. 1995). The point is that, as 
agents of the government, SOEs have to respond to the priorities and objectives of the government 
rather than those of the marketplace. Since wage setting forms a powerful tool in exercising these 
priorities (as illustrated above), it is thus no surprise that wages in the private and public sectors 
differ. 
However, in both cases the agent – the manager – rather than the owner implements the objectives 
and has scope to pursue their own objectives given asymmetric information and imperfect 
monitoring. It is also argued that the scope for discretionary behaviour by managers of state-
owned enterprises is greater than that of private firms, which might also explain differences in 
wage levels for the same occupation/skill level. The source of this additional discretionary scope is 
usually assumed to come from either the inability to easily structure incentive packages around 
fuzzy social objectives, or the lack of disciplining from the capital markets. The additional discretion 
may result in wage level differences if the manager chooses to pay higher wages in order to 
minimise labour strife and make his work environment more pleasant (Viscusi et al., p. 461); 
alternatively he or she might pay lower wages in order to spend more on managerial perquisites. 
A third reason why wages in the state-owned sector might differ from those in the private sector is 
due to differences in the marginal product of labour. Efficiency differences between the two will 
result in different wage levels if wages are related to the marginal product of labour. Popular 
opinion is that efficiency is lower in public enterprises which suggests that wages should then be 
lower on this basis. 
The ambiguous theoretical results are supported by empirical evidence that shows public sector 
wages may be higher or lower than private sector wages. Gyourko and Tracy (1988) for example 
find wages in the USA to be higher in the public sector than in the private sector, while Bonjour 
(2000) finds that public sector workers in Switzerland earn more than their private sector 
counterparts at the low end of the pay scale, while at the top end they earn less. Even in the same 
country the relationship may change over time, with Poterba and Rueben (1998) finding that public 
sector wages in the USA have declined steadily over time when compared to private sector wages. 
Finally, in a study possibly more comparable to the third-world situation faced in South Africa, 
Klitgaard (1989) finds that in many poor countries public sector wages have fallen well below the 
market-determined levels required to attract and retain necessary talent. In most of the above 
cases, the difference between the two wage levels has ranged from 0 percent to 20 percent. 
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Competitive Intensity and Wage Levels
Hendriks (1975) argues that the presence of abnormal profits in a sector is likely to result in higher 
wage levels for labour in the sector. The reason for this is two-fold. First, the presence of abnormal 
profits gives labour more bargaining power than would otherwise be the case due to changes in the 
optimal wage bargaining strategies for both employees and employers. For employees, the extra 
profits provide a lever to be used in wage negotiations, while for employers, the presence of 
greater profits increases the opportunity cost of industrial action (since, for example, a strike would 
result in a loss of abnormal profits over and above normal profits). Secondly, abnormally profitable 
firms are likely to be more able and willing to pay efficiency wages than are firms in a zero economic 
profit environment (Ibid.). Again, this is due to an increased opportunity cost to the firm, since 
shirking on the part of workers would reduce not only normal profits but abnormal profits as well. It 
is thus in the firm's own interests to pay higher efficiency wages to reduce shirking and increase 
efficiency. 
The empirical evidence tends to support this assertion. It has been shown in several American 
studies that when firms earn economic profits, the earnings of employees in those firms are likely to 
be higher than they are in firms earning only normal profits (Rose 1987). Unsurprisingly, labour rent 
sharing of this nature has been shown to be particularly evident when such labour is unionised 
(Salinger 1984). Teal (1994) shows that the same relation holds in a typical developing country 
labour market, where both the profitability of firms and the degree of unionisation are highly 
significant determinants of employee earnings. 
We expect abnormal profits to exist in sectors where competition is limited. Limits on competition 
can arise from a number of reasons, including natural scale economy rationales (e.g. financial 
services, airlines) and deliberate public entry regulation in the sector (e.g. telecommunications). 
The abnormal profit from regulation is often referred to as regulatory rents, and is particularly 
relevant to the process of restructuring state-owned enterprises in South Africa. The focus of the 
restructuring process is on utilities where regulations and not tariff barriers impose the greatest 
limits on competition. In addition, the strategy being pursued is one of using entry regulation to 
deliberately limit competition initially while both firm and regulator adjust to the new circumstances. 
We therefore expect that after the initial phase of restructuring that the former state-owned firms 
will face a period of limited competition and regulatory rents. This should then result in a wage 
premium for the employees over that component of the private sector that faces greater levels of 
competition. 
Research using time series data from the United Stated has confirmed this hypothesis for such 
industries as trucking and airlines. In her study of regulatory rents in America’s motor carrier 
industry, Rose (1985) found that firms lost up to 19 percent of their market value – as a result of 
downward adjustments in profit forecasts – when the industry was partially deregulated. Rose 
(1987) shows that wages of unionised labour in the trucking industry were fourteen per cent lower 
after the partial deregulation of that industry than they would have been had the regulation been 
maintained.
The Impact of Trade Unions and Bargaining Councils 
Rose (1987) found regulatory rent sharing to be confined to unionised labour, with little evidence of 
rent spillovers to non-union workers. This aspect of labour rent sharing   whether it applies only to 
3
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unionised employees or more widely  remains controversial, with some degree of speculation 
either way (see Dickens and Katz 1987a, 1987b). It is, however,agreed upon by most economists 
that organised labour is likely to be far more effective in extracting rents from employers than 
unorganised labour, and for this reason we expect the effects of rent-sharing in highly regulated 
industries to be far more pronounced among unionised workers than non-unionised workers. 
Thus, in the private sector, we expect the union wage premium (i.e. the gap between union and 
non-union wages) to be larger in highly regulated industries than in lightly regulated industries. In 
the public sector, however, it is a generally accepted economic fact that the union wage premium is 
usually lower than that in the private sector, even when public sector wage levels as a whole are 
higher than those in the private sector (Tracy 1988). This is usually a result of uniform pay scales in 
the public sector that apply regardless of union status. 
In the South African context, the above discussion of the relationship between union and non-
union wages is complicated by the fact that labour legislation (specifically the Labour Relations Act 
of 1995) makes provision for compulsory industry-specific centralised bargaining councils. The 
wage agreements that are determined by these councils (by a process of negotiation between 
employers and trade unions in the industry concerned) are, in theory, applicable to all workers 
within that industry, regardless of their union membership status. With such a system, one might 
expect to find little evidence for any union premium at all. However, empirical research on the 
South African labour market has shown that significant union premia do in fact exist, with estimates 
generally ranging from 10 percent to 60 percent (Moll 1993, Mwabu and Schultz 1998, Butcher and 
Rouse 2001), depending on the specification used. 
Moll (1995) suggests three arguments that explain the presence of this apparent anomaly. Firstly, 
the enforcement of the bargaining council rulings  especially in smaller firms  is incomplete, with 
the result that the wage agreements are often flouted. Secondly, bargaining council rulings are 
applied in the formal sector only, with the result that there is often a wage differential between the 
formal and informal sectors. Thirdly, unions may negotiate wage levels over and above those 
stipulated by the bargaining council, with the result that unionised workers earn a wage premium 
over their non-unionised counterparts. Both the theory and empirical evidence support the 
existence of a union wage premium in South Africa despite the presence of industrial bargaining 
councils. However, it is difficult to assert whether the firms in highly regulated sectors will have 
higher union premiums than other sectors of the economy. This is because the existence of the 
union premium depends on other factors, such as the share of small firms and the degree of 
informal-sector involvement in the industry that may differ between sectors. 
4
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5Methodology
International studies examining wage differentials between the public and private sectors or 
between highly regulated and  lightly regulated sectors have estimated separate earnings 
functions for the two groups under study to determine if any wage premiums exist for one of the 
3groups.  Earnings functions control for a host of demographic variables that influence earnings 
(from age, education, race, location, gender, etc) and then determine if the industry itself has an 
influence on the earnings levels. There are two standard methods for separating the two groups for 
comparison. The first is to make use of cross-sectional data and allocate different firms or sectors 
to different groups to estimate separate earnings functions. An alternative approach is to use time 
series data for one particular industry that can be used to compare wages before and after a 
privatisation or regulatory event in that industry. The cross-sectional approach presents problems 
in that it makes it difficult to control for extraneous industry- specific variables that could distort the 
results. For example, it may be the case that highly regulated industries also happen to be those in 
which there are skills shortages, in which case the wage premium due to regulation would be 
difficult to isolate from that, due to the skills shortage. However, in cases where limited privatisation 
and regulatory change has occurred, cross-sectional data may be the only approach possible 
given the scarcity of comparative time series data. 
In the process of privatisation and liberalisation, firms go through three distinct phases – public 
ownership, highly regulated firm with a monopoly or limited competition, and finally a lightly 
regulated firm with greater levels of competition. To accommodate this, the paper divides the 
sample into these three groups to determine whether wage levels differ between them. It makes 
use of cross-sectional data due to limited time series data (suitable data from the OHS is only 
available from 1995 onwards). 
It is also common to assume that only union members are beneficiaries of any labour rents as they 
are in a position to bargain for these rents. However, the existence of bargaining councils in South 
Africa make it likely that all labour in a specific industry, whether unionised or not, will gain from any 
agreement negotiated by the unions. For this reason, the approach in this paper is to estimate both 
total wage premia (i.e. the wage premium of all workers, regardless of unionisation, using the 
unregulated private sector as the benchmark) as well as union wage premia in each sector.
Earnings Function Specification
Rospabe (2001) analyses union wage premia for the South African labour market using cross-
sectional OHS data to derive multivariate regression functions (in which log wages are expressed 
as a linear function of variables such as race, gender, location, unionisation, education, age etc.) 
This study will follow much the same approach, using dummy variables for regulation and public 
ownership as further determinants of wages. To measure the total wage premia across the three 
sectors of the economy, a standard earnings function is used, with log earnings expressed as a 
function of exogenous worker and industry characteristics, as follows: 
where R is a set of dummies indicating the regulatory and public ownership status of the industry 
and X is a vector of exogenous worker characteristics such as race, industry, province, education 
In  w bX +  gR + e (1)  i = i i  I          
3
   In the case of regulated versus unregulated firms, any premium is assumed to measure the degree of labour rent sharing.
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6etc. (See Appendix 1 for the full list of worker characteristics included in the specification). 
When measuring the union wage premium across the three sectors, there is a choice of 
econometric specifications of varying degrees of sophistication. Four of the most common 
specifications of the premium (Rospabe 2001, p.5) are considered below. These specifications 
differ on three counts: firstly, on whether union status is considered as endogenous or exogenous; 
secondly, on whether union and non- union members share the same earnings regime or not (i.e. 
whether the earnings function is the same for both); and thirdly, on whether sample selection bias 
is taken into account. The specifications are as follows: 
' A single earnings function, with union membership treated as exogenous: 
where U is a dummy indicating the union status of the worker and X is a vector of exogenous 
worker characteristics such as race, industry, province, education etc. (See Appendix 1). This 
specification, which does not take the problem of self-selection into account, can be shown to 
lead to an overestimation of the effect of the union dummy (Ibid.) 
' A single earnings function as above, but with adjustment for sample selection:
' A separate earnings regime among union and non-union members, with no endogenous 
switching between the two (OLS):
' A separate earnings regime among union and non-union members, allowing for endogenous 
switching between the two regimes (ES):
In w bX +  gU + e (2) i = i i  I
In w bX +  gU + dl +e (3)i = i i i i
where l is the inverse Mills ratio computed from the estimate of a probit model of union  
membership (Ibid.)
In (4)
In (5)
where u indicates the union sector and n the non-union sector.
In (6)
In (7)
where l is computed using the estimate of a probit model of union membership.
wui  = buX ui +  hui  
wni  = bnX ni +  hni   
wi  = X i 1 1 2+  +  i  
wi  = X i 1 1 2+  +  i  
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7None of the above specfications has been proved superior to the others (Ibid. p.6), and for this 
reason results are usually tested for sensitivity to each of the different specifications. For the 
purpose of this paper however, and in the interest of simplicity, we use only the first specification to 
measure the union premium (i.e. equation 2). While we have seen that this will possibly lead to an 
overestimation of the effect on earnings of unionisation, we feel justified in taking this approach, at 
least as a first step, since for the purpose of this study we are primarily interested in the relative 
(rather than absolute) sizes of the union premia across the three sectors. Put differently, this 
specification may not allow us to determine the exact size of the union premium, but it will enable 
us to tell whether there is indeed a larger union premium in some sectors than in others. As a point 
of departure, this is sufficient. 
The specification of the determinants of earnings used in this analysis draws on that developed by 
Rospabe (2001). The determinants are taken to include standard human capital measures (such 
as education, experience and seniority), race, gender, province, industrial sector, marital status 
and occupation. Furthermore, it was noted in the discussion of trade unions and bargaining 
councils above that the union wage premium in an industry may be affected by the proportion of 
small firms and the degree of informal sector involvement in the industry. In an attempt to control for 
at least one of these effects, a variable for the proportion of informal sector involvement in the 
industry is also introduced using data from Hodge (1998). Appendix 1 discusses the above 
variables, and how they are derived, in more detail. The dependent variable of the regressions is 
the natural log of monthly earnings, where earnings are defined as the total salary, including bonus 
and overtime, before any deductions such as taxes, insurance payments, pension contributions 
etc. are made. Differences in the amount of hours worked per month are controlled for by 
introducing this variable as one of the determinants. 
Group Classification
Given the nature of the restructuring process where firms gradually move from one phase to 
another often through partial privatisation and the gradual introduction of competition, it is often 
difficult to allocate firms cleanly to one group or another. Making use of OHS data, it is also 
necessary to classify entire industries, which again can be problematic if there is a mix of public 
and private ownership, or if the broad sectoral classification includes both heavily regulated and 
lightly regulated sub-sectors. As the focus of the study is on utilities that go through a phase of 
regulated monopoly or limited competition after privatisation before more competition is 
introduced, the sample of public and restructured companies is mainly utilities. However, for 
regulated industries, not only previously restructured companies are included in order to broaden 
the statistical base. The eventual choice of industry classification for this paper is as follows: 
' State-owned sectors – Energy (Eskom) and transport (Transnet) excluding air and road 
transport. These sectors are dominated by state-owned companies that do not have any 
private share ownership even though they have been corporatised and subject to internal 
restructuring. 
' Highly regulated sectors – fixed line and mobile telecoms (Telkom), financial services and air 
transport (SAA). All these sectors have regulated entry and limited competition making the 
existence of regulatory rents probable while two include dominant ex state-owned enterprises 
for comparative purposes. Although neither Telkom nor SAA are fully privatised, management 
control does now reside with private investors and so their behaviour should reflect that of a 
regulated private firm. 
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8' Lightly regulated sectors  taken to include the rest of the economy including the rest of the 
service sector (e.g. retail and tourism-related services), agriculture, and manufacturing. It 
could be argued that some manufacturing sectors could be excluded from this group if they 
face high tariff barriers 
and have a concentrated industry structure making potential competition limited. 
Data 
The data used for this research have been obtained from the 1999 and 1995 October Household 
Surveys conducted by Statistics South Africa, covering 30 000 households representing the full 
spectrum of the South African population. The OHS data are collected on a stratified cluster-
sampling basis; this sampling method is taken into account when performing the regressions 
below. The dataset has been modified so that self-employed workers as well as those with non-
positive or unspecified wages are omitted. Observations with missing data on any of the variables 
included in the model specification are also omitted, leaving a sample set of 17 780 wage-earning 
employees in 1999 and   11 825 in 1995. 
Total Wage Premium
The results of the estimation of the earnings functions indicate that both the state-owned sector 
and the highly regulated sector have a wage premium over the lightly regulated private sector. The 
results displayed in table 1 show that that premium (expressed as the amount that workers in these 
sectors earn over and above their counterparts in the lightly regulated private sector) is higher for 
the highly regulated sector (11 percent in 1995 and 12 percent in 1999) than for the state-owned 
sector (8 percent in 1995). The insignificant result for the state-owned sector in 1999 indicates that 
the premium cannot be assumed to be different from zero and has therefore disappeared. All other 
results are highly significant. 
The initial premium in the state-owned sector differs to numerous countries where public sector 
wages are lower than private sector wage (see for example Klitgaard, 1989). This may be partly 
explained by the fact that the Apartheid-era government paid public sector workers a premium in 
order to garner political support during the growing internal conflict in the 1980s. The change in 
economic policy post 1994 towards fiscal restraint and reduction in inflation (Abedian and Biggs, 
1998), would have impacted on wage agreements in the public sector because of the direct 
influence that the government would have on these agreements. In addition, pressure to improve 
Wage Premiums in State-Owned and Highly Regulated Sectors
 
1995 
% 
1999 
% 
State-owned Sector 8.0 ** (1.97) 
4.1 
(0.60) 
Regulated Private Sector 11.1 *** (3.92) 
12.3 *** 
(3.24) 
Table 1: Total Wage Premia in the Highly Regulated and State-Owned 
Sectors
**statistically significant at the 5percent level; ***statistically significant at the 1 percent level
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9efficiency and raise productivity in the state-owned sector prior to the sale of these assets would 
also have added pressure to remove the wage premium that did exist. These factors would explain 
the elimination of the state-owned sector premium by 1999.
For the highly regulated sector the results are directly in line with expectations that regulatory rents 
exist and that labour has managed to capture some of the rents. The premium is not only higher 
than the state-owned sector, but also increases slightly from 1995 to 1999 in contrast to the 
elimination of the state-owned sector premium. The implication of this result for the wages of those 
employed in the state-owned sector is twofold. First, the wage premium they have enjoyed in the 
past is declining under the fiscal austerity and internal restructuring of these enterprises, making 
them worse off. However, in the event that the enterprise is restructured to a semi-privately owned 
and highly regulated firm, they can expect to see their wage premium increase to 12.3 percent, 
making them better off. So while some workers will lose their jobs in the restructuring process, 
those that remain can expect to be better off. This implies that those workers that expect not to lose 
their jobs in the restructuring process might actually support the restructuring process. However, 
as noted by Rodrik (1995) in the analysis of trade policy reform, the uncertainty faced by an 
individual over whether they expect to gain or lose from the process means that all workers will 
tend to oppose reform. It also suggests that once the initial restructuring has occurred, there is 
likely to be opposition from both labour and shareholders to further reform that reduces entry 
regulation and introduces greater competition. The reason is that this is likely to diminish the wage 
premium that labour enjoys. The wage premium may never be eliminated due to the limited scope 
for large-scale competition in these sectors that are characterised by significant economies of 
scale, but it should at least decline. 
Union Wage Premium
The estimation of the union wage premium in each of the three groups of sectors provides slightly 
unusual results. Table 2 shows that not only has the union premium been increasing since 1995, 
but that this premium is unusually lower in highly regulated and state-owned sectors.
 1995 
% 
1999 
% 
State-owned Sector 
9.0 *** 
(2.65) 
20.0 * 
(1.69) 
Regulated Private Sector 
6.3 ** 
(2.16) 
11.0 * 
(1.78) 
Lightly Regulated Sector 
16.1 *** 
(14.33) 
21.7 *** 
(10.93) 
Table 2: Union Wage Premia among Workers in Regulated and 
Unregulated Industries, 1999
*statistically significant at the 10% level; **statistically significant at the 5% level; 
***statistically significant at the 1% level
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The increase in the union premium in all sectors is indicative of both that the trade unions have 
improved their bargaining power and the non-unionised workers have lost bargaining power. 
Trade unions would have improved their bargaining power through changes in the labour 
legislation (the Labour Relations Act of 1995 and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act), while 
the large-scale job losses in all sectors of the economy since 1995 would have weakened the 
bargaining power of non-unionised workers. 
The relatively higher union premium in the lightly regulated sectors is expected in comparison to 
the state-owned sector (see Tracy, 1988). The rationale being that the public sector employs pay 
scales that do not take into account union membership. However, it is counter-intuitive why the 
union premium in the highly regulated sector of the economy is in fact lower than that in the lightly 
regulated sector, by approximately 10 percent. This finding contradicts our earlier hypothesis that 
labour rent sharing in the regulated sector would be more pronounced amongst unionised labour 
than amongst non-unionised labour. While the econometric specification used to obtain these 
results (i.e. equation 1) is fairly simplistic, the ordinal relationship of the two premia is unlikely to be 
sensitive to changes in this specification. 
One of the possible reasons for this result lies in the use of bargaining councils in South Africa. It 
was noted earlier that the effect of bargaining councils should be to eliminate the union premium 
altogether as an agreement is extended to all workers. However, due to different levels of 
enforcement in different sectors, and the ability for unions to negotiate increases above those of 
the bargaining council, the union premium does emerge. The lower premium in the highly 
regulated sector may reflect that the bargaining council agreements are more strictly enforced and 
that the union bargaining power is weak. Enforcement may be higher, because the highly 
regulated sector is comprised of services that have a high concentration of large firms and limited 
informal sector activity. While an attempt was made to control for the degree of informal sector 
involvement in each industry, this still leaves the variable of firm size unaccounted for. It is also 
plausible to suggest that government regulated firms are less likely than their unregulated 
counterparts to flout the provisions of labour legislation, simply because they find themselves 
under closer scrutiny by the government. The unions may be weaker in these sectors, because 
they may be on the defensive from job-shedding at the former state-owned firms and their higher 
proportion of skilled workers in the sectors may limit the union support base. 
The implication of this union wage premium analysis suggests that, as state-owned firms are 
restructured and enter a phase of initial regulation, the union premium declines quite considerably 
(approximately 9 percent in 1999). However, given that the total wage premium for labour in highly 
regulated firms over the state-owned sector is 12.3 percent in the same year, union members that 
retain their jobs during restructuring will continue to be better off after restructuring. Further, as 
entry regulation is relaxed and competition increases, the union members can expect to see their 
premium over other workers increase (from 11 percent to 21.7 percent) but their overall wage level 
premium decrease by 12.3 percent. This implies that they should be worse off and so, as noted 
above, are likely to join shareholders in opposing further deregulation of their industry. 
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The higher union premium in the lightly regulated, compared to the state-owned sector, suggests 
that restructuring is beneficial to union members in the end, even if they were better off under a 
highly regulated scenario. 
An important labour impact of privatisation and liberalisation that has been overlooked in the South 
African debate is the impact of these events on the wage levels of those workers that retain their 
jobs in the restructuring process. The results of this study suggest that any labour that does retain 
their jobs in the restructuring process will be better off initially. This is because the state-owned firm 
will shift to become a partially private firm that operates in a highly regulated industry with limited 
competition enabling it to earn abnormal profits and labour can share some of these profits. 
However, uncertainty at the individual level over whether they will be one of the lucky workers to 
retain their post will ensure that most workers will oppose any restructuring. The paper also 
demonstrates that any further liberalisation of the previously state-owned sector to introduce 
greater competition will make those workers worse off as their premium is eroded along with the 
abnormal profits. This applies as much to union members and non-union members. The result is 
that workers can be expected to oppose any further restructuring of these former state-owned 
firms after they have been initially reformed. 
Concluding Remarks
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Appendix 1: The Variables
Variable Determination
Dependent:
Earnings Natural logarithm of Monthly earnings
Independent: 
Primary schooling = 1 if holds any primary schooling 
Secondary schooling = 1 if holds any secondary schooling
Technical diploma = 1 if holds a technical or professional diploma (artisan, teacher etc.)
University diploma = 1 if holds a university diploma (degree, honours, master's, doctor's)
Experience = age
Experience2 = age squared
Seniority = years of tenure within the present firm 
Seniority2 = seniority squared
Race = dummy variables: white, coloured, indian, African
Gender = 1 if male
Urban/rural = 1 if works in an urban area
Marital Status = 1 if married civilly or traditionally
Sector = 1 if works in the formal sector (as indicated by the fiscal registration of the   
    employer)
Hours/month = average hours worked per month
Union status = 1 if unionised
Occupation = dummy variables: manager, professional, technical, artisan, clerical, sales,   
   skilled agriculture, machine operator, elementary worker
Industry = dummy variables: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, services, finance, 
   utilties, public
Province = dummy variables: Western Cape, Northern Cape, Eastern Cape, Free State,
    Kwazulu Natal, Gauteng, Mpumalanga, North West, Northern Province
The variables used in this model are based on those used by Rospabe (2001)
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Appendix 2
   1995   1999  
 Dependent Variable: 
In (hourly earnings) 
  
 Coefficient                              t-stat
 
 Coefficient                          t-stat
 
PRIMARY SCHOOLING 
SECONDARY SCHOOLING 
TECHNICAL DIPLOMA 
UNIVERSITY DIPLOMA 
EXPERIENCE 
2EXPERIENCE 
SENIORITY  
2SENIORITY 
AFRICAN 
COLOURED 
INDIAN 
OTHER RACE 
MALE 
URBAN 
MARRIED 
FORMAL SECTOR 
HOURS/MONTH 
UNIONISED 
 REGULATED SECTOR  
 STATE-OWNED SECTOR  
AGRICULTURE  
MINING  
UTILITIES  
CONSTRUCTION  
MANUFACTURING  
TRANSPORT  
FINANCE  
PROPORTION INFORMAL  
MANAGER  
PROFESSIONAL 
 TECHNICAL  
CLERICAL  
SALES 
SKILLED AGRICULTURE  
MACHINE OPERATOR  
ELEMENTARY WORKER  
DOMESTIC WORKER  
EASTERN CAPE  
NORTHERN CAPE  
FREE STATE  
KZN  
NORTH-WEST  
GAUTENG 
MPUMALANGA 
NORTHERN PROVINCE 
CONSTANT 
 
0.101 ***                           3.90 
0.350 ***                         12.90 
0.562 ***                           8.02 
0.800 ***                         18.20 
0.044 ***                           9.52 
-0.004 ***                          - 8.18 
0.021 ***                           9.29 
-0.001 ***                         -4.97 
-0.755 ***                        -26.15 
-0.587 ***                        -17.92 
-0.394 ***                          -8.01 
-0.130                                 -0.88  
0.241***                          14.35 
0.169 ***                           8.00  
0.121 ***                           7.05 
0.275 ***                         11.27  
0.001 ***                           3.94 
0.208 ***                         11.14  
0.123 ***                           3.24 
0.041                                    0.60 
-0.405 ***                        -13.57 
0.300 ***                           8.85 
0.462 ***                           4.94 
0.115 ***                           3.18  
0.164 ***                           6.62 
0.198 ***                           5.25  
0.192 ***                           6.12 
-0.154 ***                          -3.52 
0.556 ***                         12.18 
0.611 ***                         10.99  
0.314 ***                           7.23 
0.116 ***                           3.60 
 -0.084 ***                         -2.57 
-0.142 ***                          -3.18 
 -0.037                                -1.42 
-0.189 ***                         -7.26 
     -                                      - 
-0.482 ***                        -14.46 
-0.252 ***                        -7.27 
 -0.543 ***                       -16.27 
 -0.168 ***                       -5.57 
 -0.222 ***                       -6.64 
-0.113 ***                          -4.22 
-0.210 ** *                          -6.61 
-0.317 ***                         -9.60 
 ***  
OBSERVATIONS 
R-SQUARED 
F OBSERVED 
17780 
0.6907 
972.65 
11824 
0.5369 
342.11 
 
0.087 ***                                 5.40 
0.315 ***                               18.26 
0.478 ***                                 9.36 
0.624 ***                               23.47 
0.041 ***                               14.14 
-0.001 ***                            -12.41 
0.027  ***                              18.05 
-0.001 ***                             -11.76                                               
-0.774 ***                             -51.78 
-0.562 ***                             -32.941 
-0.357 ***                            -16.26 
        -                                        -
0.308 ***                               27.55 
0.121 ***                               10.02 
0.010 ***                               10.07 
-                                         -
0.001 ***                                6.69 
0.145 ***                              14.36 
0.111 ***                                3.92 
0.080 **                                  1.97 
-0.426 ***                            -22.88 
0.207 ***                               10.81 
0.218***                                  4.25 
0.013                                       0.61 
0.133 ***                                 9.05 
0.079 **                                   2.12 
0.122 ***                                 5.33 
-0.184 ***                              -4.25 
0.550 ***                               20.19 
0.617 ***                               12.63 
0.411 ***                                17.06 
0.061 ***                                 3.31 
-0.083 ***                              -4.20 
0.275 ***                                 4.68 
-0.110 ***                                -6.80 
-0.269 ***                              -16.07 
-0.280 ***                              -10.10 
-0.110 ***                               -5.97 
-0.187 ***                               -8.66 
-0.277 ***                              -14.93 
0.092 ***                                 5.30 
0.033 *                                    1.65 
0.199 ***                               12.16 
0.033 *                                    1.70 
0.078 ***                                 3.19 
 5.924*** 91.09
 
*significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level
Regression Results: Total Wage Premia for Private Regulated and State-owned Sectors, OHS 1995 and 1999. 
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Appendix 3 
 STATE-OWNED SECTOR REGULATED PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
NON-REGULATED 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
Dependent Variable: Log 
(hourly earnings) 
Coefficient               t-stat Coefficient                  t-stat Coefficient          t-stat 
PRIMARY SCHOOLING 
 SECONDARY SCHOOLING  
TECHNICAL DIPLOMA  
UNIVERSITY DIPLOMA 
EXPERIENCE 
EXPERIENCE2  
SENIORITY  
SENIORIY2  
AFRICAN  
COLOURED 
 INDIAN  
MALE  
URBAN  
MARRIED  
HOURS/MONTH 
UNIONISED  
AGRICULTURE  
MINING  
UTILITIES  
CONSTRUCTION 
 MANUFACTURING 
 TRANSPORT 
 FINANCE  
PROPORTION INFORMAL 
MANAGER  
PROFESSIONAL  
TECHNICAL  
CLERICAL  
SALES 
SKILLED AGRICULTURE  
MACHINE OPERATOR 
ELEMENTARY WORKER  
DOMESTIC WORKER  
EASTERN CAPE  
NORTHERN CAPE  
FREE STATE  
KZN  
NORTH-WEST  
GAUTENG  
MPUMALANGA  
NORTHERN PROVINCE  
CONSTANT 
-0.223 ***              -3.08 
 -0.038                    -0.53 
-0.406 **                -2.19 
0.188 *                   1.89 
0.038 ***                3.00 
0.000 ***                -2.80 
0.031 ***                5.87  
-0.001 ***              -4.78 
 -0.637 ***            -12.43 
-0.599 ***               -8.64 
-0.294 ***               -3.23 
0.348 ***                5.39 
 0.145 ***                3.43 
0.164 ***                4.03 
0.000                      1.49 
0.090 ***                 2.65 
    -                               -  
    -                               - 
0.165 ***                 4.20 
     -                              - 
     -                              - 
     -                              - 
     -                              - 
     -                              -  
0.276 ***                 3.19 
0.432 ***                 3.34 
0.227 ***                 3.29 
0.095                       1.59 
-0.238 **                   -2.52 
0.200 ***                   2.77 
-0.217 ***                 -4.41 
-0.386 ***                 -5.76 
-0.341 ***                 -3.60 
-0.193 ***                 -2.65 
-0.245 ***                 -2.83 
-0.321 ***                 -3.93 
0.068                       1.02 
0.008                          0.10 
0.096                       1.55 
-0.042                       -0.59 
0.018                       0.20 
6.474 ***                24.60 
-0.206                    -1.26 
0.066                         0.42 
0.135                       0.70 
0.279 *                      1.77 
0.069 ***                   6.06 
-0.001 ***              -5.23  
0.019 ***                   3.03 
0.000                      -1.43 
-0.453 ***             -10.02 
-0.294 ***               -6.02 
0.019                        0.36 
0.220 ***                   5.81 
0.150 **                    2.21 
0.082 **                    2.49 
0.002 ***                   3.95 
0.063 **                    2.16 
     -                               -  
     -                               - 
     -                               - 
     -                               - 
     -                               - 
-0.089 **                  -2.55 
      -                              - 
      -                              - 
0.661 ***                  6.98 
0.618 ***                   4.62 
0.439 ***                   5.74 
0.066                        0.87 
-0.206                       -1.46 
     -                               - 
 -0.001                      -0.01 
-0.264 **                  -2.15 
-0.290 **                  -2.48 
0.013                        0.20 
-0.162 *                    -1.84 
-0.167 **                 -2.66 
0.016                        0.28 
0.024                        0.33 
0.189 ***                   4.22 
-0.027                     -0.36 
 0.255 *                     1.78
5.575                      19.84 
0.099 ***                   6.02 
0.324 ***                 18.23 
0.532 ***                   9.55 
0.648 ***                 21.13 
0.040 ***                 12.99  
0.000 ***              -11.50  
0.027 ***                 17.01  
-0.001 ***             -10.87  
-0.835 ***             -49.04 
-0.614 ***             -31.65  
-0.421 ***             -17.25  
0.311 ***                 26.20  
0.116 ***                   9.02  
0.098 ***                  9.17 
0.001 ***                   5.84  
0.161 ***                 14.33 
 -0.418 ***             -21.81  
 0.201 ***                 10.36 
      -                             - 
0.022                        1.03 
0.131 ***                   8.73 
0.353 ***                   4.12 
0.090 ***                   3.83 
-0.145 ***                   4.05  
0.549 ***                 18.11 
0.648 ***                 11.51 
0.425 ***                 14.41 
0.062 ***                   3.00 
-0.066 ***                -3.23  
0.263 ***                   4.48 
-0.097 ***                -5.67  
-0.255 ***              -14.53  
-0.285 ***                -9.53  
-0.114 ***                -5.77 
-0.183 ***                -7.89 
-0.280 ***              -14.06  
0.095 ***                   5.05 
0.031                         1.42  
0.208 ***                 11.40 
0.039 *                      1.83 
0.076 ***                   2.91 
5.979 ***                 85.70 
OBSERVATIONS 
R-SQUARED 
F OBSERVED 
1043 
0.614 
40.23 
1124 
0.576 
45.54 
15613 
0.677 
842.36 
Regression Results: Union Wage Premia, OHS 1995 
*significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level
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Appendix 4 
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 STATE-OWNED SECTOR REGULATED PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
NON-REGULATED 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
Dependent Variable: Log 
(hourly earnings) 
Coefficient               t-student Coefficient               t-student Coefficient              t-student 
Primary Schooling 
Secondary Schooling  
Technical Diploma  
University Diploma 
Experience  
Experience2  
Seniority 
Senioriy2  
African  
Coloured 
Indian  
Other Race 
Male  
Urban 
Married  
Formal Sector 
Hours/Month  
Unionised 
Agriculture  
Mining  
Utilities  
Construction 
 Manufacturing 
 Transport 
 Finance  
Proportion Informal 
Manager 
Professional  
Technical  
Clerical  
Sales  
Skilled Agriculture  
Machine Operator  
Elementary Worker  
Eastern Cape  
Northern Cape  
Free State  
KZN  
North-West 
Gauteng  
Mpumalanga  
Northern Province  
Constant 
0.116                               0.56 
0.344                         1.53 
0.573 *                           1.84 
1.115***                        4.34  
0.022                            0.54 
0.000                           -0.78 
0.016                            0.82  
0.000                            0.08  
-0.377 ***                    -3.18  
0.030                            0.21  
0.087                            0.29 
-                                       - 
0.204                           1.26  
0.207                           1.51  
0.255 **                       2.08         
0.035                           0.15  
0.000                           0.21  
0.200 *                         1.69 
    -                               - 
    -                                - 
0.222 **                         2.16 
    -                                - 
    -                                - 
    -                                - 
    -                                - 
    -                                - 
0.457 ***                        2.58 
0.625 ***                        3.32  
0.592 ***                        3.10 
0.202                              1.35  
-0.174                       -0.71  
0.428                              1.40 
0.203                              1.40  
-0.149                       -1.03  
0.028                              0.13  
-0.306                       -1.51 
-0.113                       -0.71 
0.083                              0.43 
-0.087                       -0.40 
-0.166                       -1.36  
-0.052                       -0.34  
-0.026                       -0.17 
6.383 ***                        7.30 
-0.025                            -0.09  
0.266                           1.03 
0.236                           0.81 
0.480 *                           1.79 
0.073 ***                      3.93 
-0.001 ***                    -3.48 
0.009                          1.42  
0.000                         -1.27  
-0.567 ***                   -7.39 
-0.396 ***                    -4.31 
-0.311 **                 -2.22  
0.041                             0.21  
0.205 ***                       3.38  
0.441 ***                       3.30 
0.039                            0.58 
0.546 ***                       4.02  
0.002 **                         2.24 
0.110 *                           1.78
- - 
     -                              - 
     -                              - 
- - 
- - 
0.103                         1.42 
     -                              - 
     -                              - 
0.750 ***                   4.09  
0.776 ***                        4.25  
0.520 ***                        3.34 
0.288 *                           1.84  
0.119                              0.58  
-1.293 ***               -6.41  
0.231                          0.93  
-0.360 **                  -2.06  
-0.352 ***                -3.08 
-0.211 **                  -1.98  
-0.634 ***                -4.75  
0.028                              0.22  
-0.206                       -1.30  
0.000                          0.00  
-0.419 ***                -3.24  
-0.404 ***                -2.57  
4.717 ***                         9.04 
0.104 ***                 3.96  
0.352 ***               12.76  
0.578 ***                       7.17  
0.821 ***                     16.65  
0.044 ***                       9.05  
0.000 ***               -7.70  
0.022 ***                       8.39  
0.000 ***               -4.27 
-0.797 ***             -24.26  
-0.639 ***             -17.51  
-0.432 ***               -8.04  
-0.206                      -1.02  
0.243 ***                13.87  
0.161 ***                 7.44  
0.120 ***                 6.67  
0.264 ***               10.51  
0.001 ***                3.79 
0.217 ***              10.93  
-0.562 ***             -6.94  
 0.083                      0.77  
     -                           - 
0.086 **                  2.21  
0.058                       1.02  
0.137 ***                3.04  
0.199 ***                6.01 
-0.365 **               -1.97  
0.535 ***              10.88  
0.603 ***                9.44  
0.274 ***                5.53  
0.097 ***                2.78  
-0.093 ***             -2.77  
 -0. 142 ***           -3.15  
 -0.039                   -1.43 
-0.187 ***             -6.98  
-0.509 ***            -14.51  
-0.256 ***              -6.99  
 -0.551 ***           -15.74  
-0. 187 ***             -5.93  
-0.233 ***              -6.70  
-0.124 ***              -4.31  
-0.215 ***              -6.46  
-0.334 ***              -9.68  
6.082 ***               40.23 
OBSERVATIONS 
R-SQUARED 
F OBSERVED 
314 
0.447 
40.23 
600 
 0,524 
45.54 
10910 
0.515 
290.85 
Regression Results: Union Wage Premia OHS 1999
*significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level
